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Financing development has always been a challenge for the majority of the 
developing countries.  Among the several ways that external financing sources can 
assume, for the least developed countries (LDC) and in average, Official Development 
Aid (ODA) is the main external inflow. At the same time, many of those countries have 
a natural resources-based economy, a situation that allows them to assure a share of 
their own income in hard currency. 
 East Timor is an LDC, and became independent in 2002. Looking at domestic 
and external financing sources, the former means oil and gas export revenue (and a non-
renewable commodity) and the latter is ODA, but it is by no means the main external 
inflow. In this context, how important are the sources of financing, both in relative and 
absolute terms? How important are the other forms of external financing sources, such 
as foreign direct investment (FDI), remittances or loans? And looking at East Timor’s 
future, are they stable and guaranteed? 
 In general, annual value of ODA depends on the needs of the recipient country. 
However, and sometimes mainly, donors’ different motivations and interests are the 
key explanation factor. As ODA is so meaningfully to East Timor, it is unavoidable to 
take a close insight on it in the period between 2012 and 2018. 
In this dissertation we analyze the main bilateral and multilateral donors, i.e., 
Australia, Japan, Portugal and the United States of America, and the European Union, 
the United Nations or the Asian Bank of Development. For example, while Australia 
chooses to give assistance to geographically close countries, Portugal tends to give more 
to former colonies, while the United States of America and Japan have more 
geopolitical motivations. 
 On the other hand, oil and gas fields in East Timor’s territorial waters are 
explored by multinationals companies and the country receives an income according 
the agreements with those companies. And oil price is volatile and a non-renewable 
commodity. To prevent instability and financial losses, East Timor government set up 
a Petroleum Fund in 2005 as a Sovereign Wealth Fund. The idea is to ensure that 
future generations might beneficiate from this income. 
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This work will comparatively analyze the sources of external financing sources 
vis-à-vis the oil revenue and the factors that might influence East Timor’s ODA.  Thus, 
the main research question of this dissertation is to discuss the role of those financing 
sources and, particularly, ODA and oil as a reliable source in assuring the economic and 
social future development in East Timor. The dissertation is structured in four sections. 
Following an Introduction, Section 1 briefly presents a review of the literature on 
donors’ motivations and interests. The next section makes a brief political and economic 
overview of the country. Section 3 deals with financing development in East Timor 
while Section 4 discuss the question presented as the objective of this work. The 
dissertation ends with a Conclusion. 
1. Review of the literature: ODA’s motivations 
 
Development assistance has been measured has ODA/GNI percentage ratio, with 
the target being 0,7% agreed by all OECD DAC (Development Assistance Committee) 
members in 1970. A few countries have reached this value and the agreement was re-
endorsed in 2005 by the then members of the European Union and DAC, the target 
being to reach the 0,7% ODA/GNI in 2015. Most countries did not accomplish it. 
Of all DAC countries, only Sweden, Luxembourg, Norway and Denmark 
reached the 0,7% ODA/GNI in 2017. Of the DAC countries analyzed here, only Japan 
has a higher percentage (0.28), followed by Australia (0.23), Portugal (0.17) and the 
United States of America (0.16). The United States of America are among the countries 
that give less development assistance in ratio terms, but nevertheless it is the country 
that gives more aid in total gross disbursements as a result of its high GNI. (see OECD 
Stat.) 
Historically, most countries have given development aid through bilateral 
assistance, but multilateral assistance has increased over the years. Bilateral aid is 
usually linked to political and economic interests, while Multilateral aid is consistent 
with the recipient development needs. 
Bilateral aid usually supports political and economic interests of the donors, and 
the clear goals of the donors’ governments. This is called “tied aid”, when a country 
donates aid, but the recipient country is obliged to contract donor’s firms to do the job. 
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Tying aid is usually related to less altruistic countries, such as the United Stated of 
America, the United Kingdom and France (see Radelet, 2006). 
During the Cold War, the United States of America, and the Soviet Union, used 
bilateral aid as a foreign policy instrument. Taiwan and China have also done so, in 
order to try to gain government recognition from other countries (see Alesina and 
Dollar, 2000). 
Former colonial links also play an important role in aid allocation (see Alesina 
and Dollar, 2000), and Mishra et all consider that “for bilateral donors being a former 
colony is important in their allocation process, for their multilateral counterpart export 
to recipient countries is the key donor interest indicator” (Mishra, Ouattara and Parhi, 
2011). 
If foreign aid is “tied” and related to political and economic interests of the donor 
country, it is likely that aid’s impact will not promote growth and that it will not be 
effective on development promotion (see Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004). 
The Paris Declaration (2005) committed DAC countries to continue making 
progresses with non-tied aid to less developed countries, as pledged in 2001. Since 
many targets were not accomplished, Accra Agenda for Action (2008) occurred to 
encourage countries to plan aid in order to end tied aid. Later, Busan Partnership on Aid 
Effectiveness (2011) asked that efforts to finish with tied aid and improve quality, 
consistency and transparency be accelerated, while reporting aid. The Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) that are regarded as a continuation of the Millennium 
Development Goals, recognize that sustainable development is a shared mission, and 
which achievement interest relies on all countries’ interests. (Keijzer and Lundsgaarde, 
2017). 
About 40% of aid is multilateral, while 60% is bilateral, of which circa 17,4% is 
tied. The World Bank estimated that “tied aid” reduced actual ODA value in ¼.  (Ali, 
Banks and Parsons, 2015) (OECD, 2016) 
It is also noted that smaller recipient countries tend to receive more aid per capita 
than larger ones. Donors usually want to influence the largest possible number of 
countries, which leads to a disproportionate amount of aid to larger and smaller recipient 
countries (see Radelet, 2006). Smaller countries are also generally preferred by donors, 
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since it is easier to generate political influence in less populated countries, and for this 
reason aid dependency tends to be higher in smaller recipient countries than in larger 
ones. It was also noted a “bandwagon effect” - when a country receives more aid from 
a specific donor, wherefore this will tend to attract more aid from other donors as well 
(see Harrigan and Wang, 2011; and Mishra, Ouattara and Parhi, 2011). There is also an 
inverse relationship between the number of donors and the amount of aid provided by 
an individual donor country. (Chong and Gradstein, 2006) 
One other question is the political nature of donor countries: conservative 
governments tend to oppose more to foreign aid than liberal ones. One of the reasons is 
that foreign aid usually implies higher taxes, another it that it is linked on to the welfare 
state. Conservative governments usually believe that “in a free market, poor countries 
would do well, and that aid only increased bureaucracy and created big government and 
dependence.” (Tingley, 2009) When conservative governments tend to give foreign aid, 
the tendency is to be more bilateral than multilateral assistance,  and  “… as 
governments become more conservative, the share of GDP committed to foreign aid 
effort declines”. (Tingley, 2009) On the other hand, liberal governments believe that 
foreign aid will help recipient countries fill the gaps where the market fails, matching 
the belief in accepting the role of the state in economy. (Tingley, 2009) 
Aid that is usually promoted by geopolitical preferences has an impact on 
development. Bilateral aid promotes certain political positions, as for example the UN 
Security Council behavior – the donor’s strategic interests were correlated to the United 
Nations General Assembly and the Security Council’s votes. When aid interests are 
non-strategic for the donor, it is empirically demonstrated that increases development 
results (Gulrajani, 2017).  
Different bilateral donors prioritize different interests, such as colonial links, 
language and traditional links, which are taken into account when choosing a recipient 
country. 
In the 1980s, for example, the recipient countries in Africa received ODA mostly 
due to economic, politic, colonial linkage, strategic and political relevance. Poverty was 
never a relevant index to allocate official aid, and development and humanitarian 
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politics were rarely prioritized. After the Cold War, aid movements diminished, but 
were always motivated for strategic interests. 
The 1998 World Bank report showed that ODA was more effective in alliance 
with stable macroeconomic environments, open trade policies, efficient public 
bureaucracies, and yet countries continued to follow their interests.  
ODA has increased for the countries with needs, as it is the case of the less 
developed and lower income countries. This confirms that traditional donors (DAC 
countries) are in a process of reallocating their expenses as ODA with the international 
agreements that delineate aid to countries with bigger needs. 
Among non-DAC countries, only China and Indonesia are emerging donors, 
which means that these countries are not traditional donors and do not report to OECD, 
and consequently their ODA statistics are more difficult to reach. It is acknowledged 
that China is the largest donor to emerging economies, and one of the biggest donors 
amongst the developing countries (see Rowlands, 2008). Development assistance flows 
have highly increased over the later years, and are considered an important foreign 
policy tool.  
There is an increase in the role of non-traditional donor states, such as Turkey, 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Israel, Czech Republic, Thailand, among others. India and China 
have dramatically increased their contributions to development over the past decade. 
Non-traditional donors account to about 10% of total ODA. If DAC countries continue 
to increase their amounts of ODA, it will be hard for emerging donors to influence the 
agenda and build their own global system. These countries are still regarded as recipient 
countries, as well. (Quadir, 2013) 
South-South Cooperation arises from promoting “horizontal cooperation” based 
on the principles of equality, partnership and mutual interest. Along with the interest of 
changing the conventional aid practice, the non-DAC countries have different political 
and philosophical visions about foreign aid. Each country follows the agenda based on 
its distinct development vision, which does not pay much attention to social justice, 
environmental sustainability, human rights and democracy. 
Most governments of emerging donors have to deal with poverty and with the 
increase of inequalities in their own countries, which seriously hinders the justification 
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Figure 1 - East Timor Map 
of public expenses in foreign development projects. Busan Document presents two 
innovations: the recognition of new actors besides DAC countries, and a better balance 
between representation and inclusion as a solution for a bigger legitimacy of problems 
because they were allowed to integrate the development agenda. (Esteves and 
Assunção, 2014) 
Middle East countries oriented their ODA to countries that did not have 
diplomatic relations with Israel and showed similar patterns of conduct to Saudi Arabia 
in the United Nations. (Ali, Banks and Parsons, 2015) 
In the case of China, interests in pursuing a policy on foreign aid are very 
political and economic, considering that China uses its foreign aid policy to create a 
favorable international environment for its development and increase of power status. 
In the 1990’s many Chinese companies benefited from China’s foreign policy as a result 
of its economic interests in recipient countries. (Fuchs and Rudyak, 2017) 
2. A brief overview on East Timor  
 
2.1. Towards Independence (2002) 
 
East Timor was first occupied by Portugal in 1515 and this occupation lasted 
until 1974. During this period, East Timor was invaded by Japan in the Second World 





























Notwithstanding the fact that under the Portuguese Constitution of 1951 East Timor 
was considered an ultramarine territory and a Portuguese province equal to any other, 
the United Nations saw East Timor as a non-autonomous territory under Portuguese 
administration. With the increase of the right to self-determination, the decolonization 
of the world and the 25th April 1974 revolution in Portugal, the Portuguese government 
at the time allowed the creation of political parties in East Timor. Among the parties 
created were the UDT, who supported the integration of Timor in a Portuguese speaking 
world; FRETILIN, who claimed for an independent country; and APODETI, that 
suggested the integration of East Timor in the Indonesian community. 
The FRETILIN party won the elections and on 28th November 1975, East Timor 
was declared an independent country. But nine days after the proclamation of 
independence East Timor was invaded and occupied by the Indonesian military forces, 
who later integrated the Timorese territory to Indonesia. The United States of America 
supported Indonesia on the grounds that FRETILIN was a Marxist organization. This 
support by the American government was followed by the United Kingdom, France, 
and Australia, which totaled 3/5 of the permanent United Nations Security Council 
members. 
 
Indonesian occupation lasted for almost twenty-five years. During this period, East 
Timor was recognized as an Indonesian province by thirty-five of the 185 United 
Nations members. Despite all the past pressure for East Timor’s independence from 
Portugal, the United Nations never intervened to restore Timor’s independence until 
1999. 
 
After several years of serious violent acts against the Timorese people, and almost 
twenty-five years later, the United Nations decided to take action and intervene. The 
United Nations had four missions in East Timor: 
 
• The first mission was the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET, 
June-October 1999). This mission’s objective was to analyze whether the 
Timorese wanted to be independent or not; 
 
• The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET, 
October 1999-May 2002), headed by Sérgio Vieira de Mello, exercised 
administrative authority over East Timor during the transition to independence; 
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• The United Nations of Support in East Timor (UNMISET, May 2002-2005) 
was also a peacekeeping mission, and its priority was to give assistance to the 
new-born country; 
 
• The United Nations Office in East Timor (UNOTIL, May 2005-31st December 
2012) supported the development of critical institutions, including the state, as 
well as Human Rights issues. 
The Portuguese Prime-Minister at the time, António Guterres, always showed his 
support to the cause of East Timor. In 2020, East Timor was one of the most recent 
countries in the world. It chose the Portuguese version as the official name of the 
country, Timor-Leste. It also opted to model its Constitution on that of Portugal. 
 
2.2. Post-independence period 
East Timor became a democracy based on a political multiparty system and a market 
economy. A Constituent Assembly election was held on the 30th of August 2001, the 
second anniversary of the independence referendum. A new Constitution was 
promulgated in March 2002, and following independence on May 20th, served as its 
first Parliament. Since then, elections, both legislative and presidential, have been 
regularly held.  
A national army was established for the defense of the country, and Portugal has 
been one of the main partners (Bernardino, 2018). Political instability has sometimes 
occurred as result of rivalries between the President and the parties, or among them. 
Another concern is corruption. Some authors stressed the attempts by the ruling elite to 
capture the benefits of the oil rent (Blunt, 2009). 
In the political and diplomatic front, East Timor is a member of the United Nations, 
IMF or World Bank among other international institutions.  In 2011 East Timor applied 
for membership of ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations), and continues 
to apply, since different regional interests have prevented the country to become a 
member until now. In the economic field East Timor is a member of the Asian 
Development Bank. 
Due to its oil and gas fields, East Timor has been under a turmoil of economic and 
geopolitical interests that involve more directly Australia and Indonesia. Changes all 
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over the world have also occurred in Southeast Asia, as have China’s political and 
economic moves towards East Timor, which is perhaps the best example. All the same, 
it is noteworthy to stress Japan and Malaysia moves, among others.  
 
2.3. The economic context 
 
After having been a colony of Portugal until 1975, the occupation by Indonesia in 
that year had a similar effect on the economic and social development of East Timor. 
In other words, lacking political autonomy and subjected to specific interests, first of 
Portugal followed by Indonesia, the postponement of a development project ensued. 
According to Table 1, in 2003, one year after independence, the GDP value was 
barely 543 million dollars. And the fact that three years later GDP was multiplied by 
five is not the result of some economic miracle.  
Table 1: GDP in M USD 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
_ 543 1078 1814 2658 2881 4391 3200 3999 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2108  
5682 6671 5650 4045 3104 2521 2955   
Source: World Bank (2018) 
 
It is, however, the result of negotiations between the Timorese authorities and 
Australia in 2002, to establish the sharing of resources through the Joint Petroleum 
Development Area which stipulated that 90% of the benefits were to be allocated to 
East Timor. Coincidentally, since that moment the world witnessed the strong rise of 
the price of oil on the international market, which lasted until 2008 when they fell back 
for a short period, to rocket again. That explains how in 2012, ten years after 
independence, GDP was multiplied by 13! 
The impact of the agreement on the Timorese economy is tremendous. Table 2 
clearly highlights the characteristics of an economy dependent on oil and gas. 
 
Table 2: Oil rents /GDP in % 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
45.1   61.6 55.9 37.8 41.0 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
41.8 32.6 35.5 40.8 17.3 14.0 14.5 
Source: World Bank (2018) 
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As a consequence, the importance of this sector is reflected on the reduced 
weight of the non-oil activities on GDP (Table 3). 
 Table 3: GDP non-oil in % 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 90.2 40.9 25.4 17.0 18.8 14.7 22.7 22.0 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2108  
18.5 17.2 24.7 35.7 51.4 65.6 54.4   
Source: author from World Bank (2018) 
 
 Since the sharing agreement of 2002 came into effect, the importance of the non-
oil sector on GDP fell from 90.2% in 2003 to a minimum of 14.7% in 2008, when oil 
prices begun to decline. In 2013/14, when the second oil shock occurred, and only 
because of the falling price-effect, non-oil GDP became worth more than half the 
national wealth, reaching a maximum of 65.6% in 2016. 
 In order to guarantee the level of domestic demand, East Timor, with a poorly 
diversified economic structure, namely of the agricultural and industrial sector, must 
resort to imports, of goods but also of services. In 2018 the coverage rate was 7.8% 
(DGE, 2019). Its trade balance has always been strongly negative, with a high ratio to 
GDP. According to the IMF (2019, p.5), in 2015 the commercial deficit was 635 million 
dollars and 626 MUSD in 2016, corresponding to 20% of GDP. The dimension of this 
economy may be assessed by the value of the export of goods, which roughly amounts 
20 million dollars (18 MUSD and 22 USD, in 2015 and 2018 respectively). It is 
essentially coffee, and the main destination markets have been the USA, Germany, 
Indonesia and Singapore. As regards imports, the key supplier market has been 
Indonesia (about 30%), followed by China and Hong Kong (each with almost 20%). In 
recent years the latter have surpassed Indonesia (around 15%) and Malaysia (Banco de 
Portugal, 2018/19 and DGE, 2019). In short, the import market is Asian and the export 
market is non-Asian. 
 This commercial deficit with the exterior is accompanied by another deficit, at 
times of a similar amount, the deficit of the services balance. However, the above-
mentioned importance of oil revenues turns the balance of current transaction into a 
superavit, except when the oil price drops significantly, as it has been observed since 




Table 4: Current Account Balance (M USD) 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
_ -44.09 65.58 262.12 540.95 1177.2 2021.75 1284.96 1671.38 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2108  
2346.05 2736.02 2390.04 1106.16 224.82 -533.08 -339.08 -89.55  
Source:  UNCTAD (2020) 
 
 As a result of the financial importance of the oil rent, and bearing in mind that it 
originates from a non-renewable source and also the structural bottlenecks of the 
economy, the government decided to establish in 2005 a Sovereign Wealth Fund, called 
the Petroleum Fund, in order to meet the requirement in Article 139 of the Constitution 
of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (RDTL) (MF, 2019, p.3)1. The petroleum 
and gas income are deposited in the PF and the government is limited to spend annually 
3% of the total petroleum wealth, the so-called Estimated Sustainable Income (ESI) or 
“permanent income hypothesis”2. Given the importance of the PF, and aiming at being 
internally and internationally transparent, East Timor became a member of the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). In a move to have the sovereignty 
of the oil revenues from the oil fields in national waters, in March 2018 East Timor and 
Australia signed a treaty to establish, for the first time, permanent maritime boundaries. 
The agreement will allow the development of the Greater Sunrise fields, which 
represents a source of substantial inflows to the PF” (MF, 2019, p.3). 
3. Financing development in East Timor 
 
East Timor, with a fragile and poorly diversified economy, depends in large scale 
on the purchase from abroad of goods and services for private and public consumption, 
and on investment. Its forms of external payment revolve around the oil revenues and 
the gains of the Petroleum Fund applications. The value of exports is low. And although 
the return of PF is not negligible, it is not sufficient. 
 
1 According to MF, 2019, p.3, “the Constitution mandates a fair and equitable use of State-owned natural resources 
in accordance with national interests, and that the income derived from the exploitation of these resources should 
lead to the establishment of a mandatory financial reserve. The Petroleum Fund was created under the provision 
of the Petroleum Fund Law No.9/2005 (3 August 2005) as amended by the Law No.12/2011 (28 September 2011)” 
2 “The Law regulates the withdrawals in order to sustainably manage petroleum wealth and smooth spending over 
time. Withdrawals in excess of the ESI can be made provided that the Parliament approves the Government’s 
explanation that this is in the long-term interests of the country” (MF, 2019, p.3) 
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In face of the exiguity of national savings to finance development, it becomes 
necessary to mobilize external savings. Pioneer studies, such as those by Chenery and 
Strout (1966), seek to show that usually in developing countries there are two gaps in 
the economy, the saving gap, linked to the sparse internal savings and which limits 
domestic investment, and the foreign exchange/trade gap that reflects a deficit of 
currencies that are necessary to guarantee imports and to level the balance of payments. 
Known as the Dual-Gap Model, the authors claim that this case represents the existence 
of a chronic scarcity of financial resources for the economy, which foreshadows an 
‘investment limited growth’ and/or a ‘trade limited growth’. To fill these two gaps is 
therefore the role of external financing of development. This justifies the analysis of the 
characteristics of external financing of development in East Timor vis-à-vis the return 
of FP, and to draw the appropriate conclusions about the future of East Timor on this 
subject.  
3.1. ODA  
 
The analysis of the Official Development Assistance to East Timor between 
2002 and 2017, asks that the study be divided in two parts: bilateral and multilateral aid 
(Table 5). 
 
Table 5: ODA’s gross disbursements to East Timor (USD millions, current) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total 219.05 175.03 161.24 184.62 209.14 279.96 271.37 212.55 290.03 
- bilateral 188.38 147.7 141.35 160.43 174.25 227.56 230.29 183.02 258 
      (grants) 188.38 147.7 141.35 160.43 174.25 227.56 230.29 183.02 258 
- multilateral        30.67 27.33 19.88 24.18 34.85 52.37 41.01 29.34 31.54 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2108  
Total 275.8 284.28 259.28 251.31 212.52 223.79 232.01 207.34  
- bilateral 243.08 210.49 199.8 184.61 148.72 161.14 163.54 157.86  
      (grants) 243.08 210.48 198.09 183.8 148.55 155.85 161.11 154.75  
- multilateral        32.44 73.56 59.39 66.43 63.57 62.59 68.31 49.48  
Source: from https://stats.oecd.org 
 
In order to better highlight the importance of bilateral ODA in relative terms, 





Table 6: ODA’s bi and multi gross disbursements (%) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
- bilateral 86.0 84.4 87.7 86.9 83.3 81.3 84.9 86.1 89.0 
- multilateral        14.0 15.6 12.3 13.1 16.7 18.7 15.1 13.8 10.9 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2108  
- bilateral 88.1 74.0 77.1 73.5 70.0 72.0 70.5 76.1  
- multilateral        11.8 25.9 22.9 26.4 29.9 28.0 29.4 23.9  
Source: author calculation from https://stats.oecd.org 
 
At least 70% of total ODA has always been bilateral and above 80% most of the 
time. However, bilateral ODA seems to shape a slower downsizing trend from 2010 
onwards, with multilateral aid more than doubling its share (10.9% in 2010 and 23.9% 
in 2018). Could this be individual donor’s fatigue, as some authors describe in general 
this situation, or a new coordinated strategy envisaged by the two actors of donor aid? 
The fact is that in value, bilateral ODA decreased, and multilateral ODA increased.   
In what concerns bilateral ODA (Annex 1), four countries - Australia, Japan, 
Portugal and the United States of America – need to be specifically addressed, taken 
that in every single year they were responsible for at least 70% of the total bilateral aid 
(78% in 2002, 80% in 2012 and 82% in 2018) (Figure 2 with China included). South 
Korea, the United Kingdom and Sweden are three more donors to be considered. The 
absolute value of bilateral ODA had been increasing from 188 M USD in 2002 to 258 
M USD in 2010, but since then it has diminished, at a regular pace, to 157 M USD in 
2018. The aid motivations and the interests behind these disbursements differ in every 
case, from economic, geographical, historical, cultural and linguistical proximity, 




Figure 2 - ODA Disbursements to East Timor between 2002 and 2018 
 in Million USD, current prices 
 
Source: author, from OECD Stat 
Among these countries, Australia is by far the biggest donor country in absolute 
values to East Timor, except for the year 2002, when Portugal allocated more 50% than 
Australia. However, Portugal’s donations have been decreasing and in 2018 aid was 
only 1/5 compared to 2002, and one fourth of Australia’s aid. This country has been 
increasing ODA and eventually became the first donor to East Timor, overcoming 
Portugal. ODA’s value achieved the maximum in 2010 (124 M USD) but since then aid 
has decreased, but Australia remains the main bilateral donor. Finally, a look at Japan. 
In 2002 aid was 5 M USD and behind the United Kingdom. A stronger more 
commitment to East Timor places it in second position since 2015 (31 M USD in 2018).  
Although in absolute terms Portugal is the country that donates less among the 
four main donors, Portugal turns out to be the biggest donor in relative terms (Fig.3).  
Soon after independence, and due to its historical and political responsibilities, 
Portugal’s commitment to support Timor Leste became a diplomatic and foreign policy 
priority to Portugal. This explains the 24% of Portugal’s total ODA channeled to East 
Timor , and which remained the main country target until 2007. As regards Australia, 









2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
ODA disbursements to Timor-Leste between 2002 and 2018 
in Million USD, current prices
Australia Japan Portugal United States of America China
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Japan, East Timor is not a priority since less than 1% of their total ODA goes to this 
country.  
 
Figure 3- Share of ODA to East Timor in the total ODA given by country donor 
(2002 and 2018) in Million USD, 2018 constant prices. 
 
Source: from OECD Stat 
It is noteworthy that all of these donors, with the exception of Portugal, 
prioritized Indonesia over East Timor as a recipient country. This is particularly relevant 
since Indonesia invaded East Timor in 1975, right after Portugal gave independence to 
the country. The Indonesian non-pacific invasion lasted until 1999, when the United 
Nations assumed the country’s government, and only in 2002 did East Timor become 
completely independent. Donor countries chose to give more to Indonesia probably due 
to political and economic relations and interests.  
Ranking the importance of East Timor from the perspective of donors gives an 
idea of how differently East Timor is prioritized by each donor (Table 4). While 
Australia and Portugal prioritize East Timor since 2002, and that is more evident for the 
latter country, the same does not happen with Japan or the United States of America.  
While the political transition showed to be irreversible after 2002, Portugal 







2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Australia Japan Portugal United States of America
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Timor ranked in third, fourth or even fifth position from 2008 onwards. Slightly bit 
different is what is happening with Australia, the main donor in absolute value. Since 
2015 East Timor has become more relevant (fourth and fifth position). The negotiations 
towards the need of an achievement of an oil agreement in the Sunrise camp could 
explain it. Actually, it happened. 
 
Table 7 - ODA ranking from East Timor’s perspective and donor’s perspective  
 Source: author from OECD Stat 
 Note:  (1) ranking from East Timor’s perspective  
   (2) ranking from donor’s perspective 
 
Portuguese aid motivations, comparing to Australian, Japanese or American, are 
in fact more different and specific when it comes to choose aid allocation. Historical, 




    (1)        (2) 
Japan 
    (1)        (2) 
USA 
    (1)        (2) 
Portugal 
    (1)        (2) 
2002 2nd 3rd 4th 83rd 3rd 63rd 1st 1st 
2003 2nd 8th 4th 66th 3rd 72nd 1st 1st 
2004 1st 5th 4th 56th 2nd 70th 3rd 3rd 
2005 1st 7th 3rd 31st 4th 75th 2nd 2nd 
2006 1st 6th 4th 39th 3rd 80th 2nd 2nd 
2007 1st 5th 4th 56th 3rd 70th 2nd 1st 
2008 1st 7th 4th 39th 3rd 71st 2nd 3rd 
2009 1st 7th 4th 71st 3rd 77th 2nd 3rd 
2010 1st 4th 3rd 51st 4th 74th 2nd 3rd 
2011 1st 7th 4th 43rd 2nd 67th 3rd 4th 
2012 1st 8th 4th 51st 2nd 81st 3rd 5th 
2013 1st 6th 2nd 50th 3rd 84th 4th 3rd 
2014 1st 7th 3rd 55th 2nd 75th 4th 3rd 
2015 1st 8th 2nd 49th 3rd 81st 4th 3rd 
2016 1st 7th 2nd 31st 3rd 78th 4th 4th 
2017 1st 4th 2nd 44th 3rd 81st 4th 3rd 
2018 1st 5th 2nd 36th 3rd 86th 4th 3rd 
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when compared. Political interests also have a relevant role but are more unstable, while 
bonds between a former colony and the colonizing country usually follow a leveled 
pattern. 
In what concerns multilateral ODA, there are four main donors to East Timor: 
the European Union Institutions, the United Nations, the Asian Development Bank and 
the International Development Association (IDA) from the World Bank. The data from 
the Asian Development Bank contributions to East Timor was only available from 2012 
onwards (fig.6). 
 
Figure 4 - Multilaterals' ODA disbursements to Timor-Leste between 2002 and 2018 
in Million USD, current prices 
 
Source: OECD Stat 
Between 2002 and 2018, the major contributions always came from the 
European Union institutions, followed by the Asian Development Bank, the United 
Nations and IDA. The EU has been the main provider of ODA except in 2015 and 2018, 
when it lost the first position to the AsDB, which is notably increasing ODA to East 
Timor. The World Bank, through IDA, is not a relevant partner, despite a slightly 
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Multilaterals' ODA disbursements to Timor-Leste between 
2002 and 2018 in Million USD, current prices
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United Nations International Development Association
 
 18 
In 2002 the EU contributed to 70% of the total multilateral disbursements, 
decreasing to almost 40%, and currently it represents about 30%. According to data, the 
AsDB contribution was only 13% in 2012, behind the UN and IDA, but in 2018 it was 
the main donor (around 30%). 
Comparing the Multilateral’s involvement in East Timor to the total channelized 
to all the recipient countries (Fig.5), it is noticeable that the Asian Development Bank 
gives a higher percentage to East Timor than the other Multilaterals, which have very 
similar values. In fact, in 2018 the amount of ODA from AsDB and the EU were similar, 
but it represented an effort of more than 2% for the former and just 0,2% for the latter. 
This might be due to the fact that the Asian Development Bank has a smaller group of 
recipient countries of its ODA, which increases its relative value when comparing to 
the other Multilaterals, or the result of an East Timor’s strategy looking for more 
involvement of Asian partners. 
 
Figure 5 - Share of ODA to East Timor in the total ODA given by multilaterals (2002 
and 2018) in Million USD, 2018 current prices 
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Looking at the allocation of ODA to different sectors, it results from a 
combination of each country preferences in accordance with the recipient country. Aid 
is allocated in seven main different sectors established by the OECD: Social 
Infrastructure and Services, Economic Infrastructure and Services, Production Sectors, 
Multisector, Programme Assistance, Humanitarian Aid and Unallocated/Unspecified 
(see Annex 2). These sectors are then divided into sub-sectors. The data collected was 
only made for the years between 2005 and 2017, since there are no data for the years 
prior to these. In 2017 Unallocated/Unspecified aid allocation to East Timor had an 
increase of about 1700%. 
Due to the scarcity of human resources in East Timor, technical cooperation is 
transversal to all sectors and from an aggregate point of view it absorbs a huge 
proportion of ODA (Table 8). 
Table 8: ODA - Technical cooperation (M USD) 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
99.87 97.92 77.41 70.73 75.66 99.18 78.64 81.71 142.86 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2108  
143,12 114,1 92,93 68,73 56,16 65,92 69,68 58,99  
Source: https://stats.oecd.org 
In absolute values of ODA gross disbursements, most aid to East Timor was 
allocated to Social Infrastructure and Services, with an average of 134,5 USD millions 
per year, while disbursements in other sectors were between 0 and 50 USD millions. 
Social Infrastructure and Services are divided into “Education” and “Water Supply and 
Sanitation”, with Education being the category with the largest amount of donations. 
The sector of Economic Infrastructure and Services is divided in two categories, 
“Energy” and “Transport and Communications”, the latter being a category with an 
enormous increase in donations since 2011. On the other hand, aid values for the sector 
of energy have decreased, being really close to zero. 
Production sectors are divided into the categories of “Agriculture, forestry and 
fishing”, “Industry, mining and construction” and “Trade and Tourism”. Aid allocated 
to this section goes mostly to the Primary sector “Agriculture, forestry and fishing”, and 
the donations to Secondary and Third sector are very close to zero. This demonstrates 
that East Timor still has an economy very dependent of the Primary sector. 
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A close look of ODA allocation by each country to East Timor, shows that 
Australia and Portugal donate most aid to the sector of Social Infrastructure and 
Services. Japan, on the other hand, focuses and allocates most of its donations on the 
Economic Infrastructure and Services and Production Sectors’ sectors. The United 
States of America, in turn, chose to allocate aid almost equally to each sector, giving a 
bigger emphasis to sectors such as Humanitarian Aid or Programme Assistance – 
sectors that have usually a small percentage of the total aid received in East Timor. 
 In short, the meaning of total ODA either to the State Budget or to national 
income is impressive. 
East Timor’s State Budget is divided into similar sectors and categories to the 
ones followed by the OECD. Official Development Assistance to the 2017 State Budget 
had a contribution of about 225% on average to those sectors, when compared with 
domestic contribution. For instances, ODA allocation to the sector of Education and 
the sector of Agriculture and Fisheries was 912% and 363% higher than the State 
Budget allocation for the same sectors in 2017, respectively. Also, the ODA 
allocation to sectors such as Water and Sanitation, Energy, Transports and Tourism was 
39%, 0%, 14% and 19%, respectively. This shows that in some sectors East Timor is 
still very dependent on Official Development Assistance. 
In terms of the national income, since the independence of East Timor, the 
relative importance of ODA has become lesser: 23.5% in 2002, 7.7% in 2010 and 6.6% 
in 2018 (Table 9). By all means it is still very significant. Bearing in mind the 
explanation given in point 2 about the evolution of East Timor’s GDP (even if it is 
different from GNI), the oil factor helps to explain it. 
 
Table 9: ODA /GNI (%) 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
23.55 20.69 20.66 18.92 13.37 11.53 7.01 7.24 7.73 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2108  
5.3 4.83 4.79 5.49 5.32 7.11 7.22 6.69  
Source:  https://stats.oecd.org 
3.2. Foreign direct investment (FDI) 
 
FDI is usually the main important source of external financing. The impact in terms 
of employment, diversification of the economy, trade balance, know-how and human 
 
 21 
resources are some features that every demanding country must take in account. The 
competition is hard and the host country should offer political stability and sound 
economic policies.  
The case of East Timor shows how difficult it is to attract FDI. Table 10 speaks for 
itself; the maximum has been 49 M USD. Some Portuguese investment in coffee 
production (Nabeiro Group) and other investments in commerce are the bulk of FDI. 
 
Table 10: FDI in M USD 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
_ 4.519 .. 0.908 8.478 8.695 39.698 49.931 28.516 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2108  
47.075 38.531 49.615 49.344 42.995 5.479 6.716 47.926  
Source: UNCTAD (2020)  
3.3. Remittances 
 
Since the last decade remittances have become the main, or at least one of the top 
sources of external financing, particularly for developing countries. The same occurs in 
East Timor. For a very long time has a large diaspora lived abroad, a consequence of 
the Indonesia occupation in 1975. This diaspora has settled mainly in Europe, namely 
in Portugal and the UK (Wigglesworth, A. and Boxer, L., 2017), where in the latter 
country an estimated 20.000 Timorese live. Asia is also an important destination, 
agreements with South Korea and Australia were made, and Japan and New Zealand 
might open up in the near future (Rose, 2019). From independence to the present days, 
the difficulties faced by the government to boost the development of the country led to 
a scarcity of new jobs. Emigration seemed(s) an obviously response, a sort of way-out. 
  The result is a rise of the inflows of remittances: from a mere 3.6 MUSD in 
2005, a peak was observed in 2010 and 2011, when they reached the value of 136 
MUSD and then fell. But since 2013, every year remittances have increased, up to 96 
MUSD in 2018. 
 
Table 11: Remittances in M USD 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
3.642 10.444 17.655 113.347 137.135 136.896 119.859 
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2108  
33.649 43.679 61.5861 80.1746 87.0445 96.32  
Source: World Bank (2018, 2020 and 2020a) 
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3.4. Loans   
 
There are commercial loans and official loans. In the case of East Timor, the former 
are insignificant or null while the latter (concessional) assume the form of widespread 
grants (see Table 5). 
The contribution of this source of external financing raises three remarks. First, the 
extremely low amount involved. Second, the substitution of the World Bank, through 
IDA, as the main lender from 2012 until 2018. Third, there is no loan from the IMF. It 
is unusual that in low income developing countries, neither the World Bank nor the IMF 
have an important presence.  
 
Table 12: Loans from Multilateral Finantial Institurions (M USD) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
WB     . 4.17 .. 5.22 1.21 3.25 4.78 3.81 4.4 
IMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AsDB 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2108  
WB     1.67 9.18 4.2 4.96 11.17 14.4 10.37 2.86  
IMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
AsDB 0 9.55 19.03 18.25 25.24 12.6 12.8 15.33  
Source: from https://stats.oecd.org 
 
3.5. Return on (of the) Petroleum Fund   
 
The amount of the PF is applied in the international markets (deposits and bonds) in 
order to generate a return from its application. According to the PF’s initial report “the 
first investments started on 9 September 2005 when USD 79.6 million US dollars were 
transferred from the Timor Gap Account together with 125 million US dollars from the 
Consolidated Fund of Timor-Leste (CFET) and taxes and other petroleum revenue 
totaling 438.2 million US dollars were paid to the Petroleum Fund during the year ended 
30 June 2006” (MPF, 2006, p.1). 
 The significance of the income paid by foreign extractive companies was 
previously well explained in terms of the GDP or the balance of payments. 
Consequently, if the annual revenue of the PF is volatile or even worse, negative, this 
compromises the economic, social and political balance in the country. Tabel 13 shows 




Table 13: Petroleum Fund –annual return (MUSD) and yield  
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
MUSD 7.3 48.8 92.4 223.7 31.5 221 221 
Yield (%) 4.6 5.12 5.28 10.6 0.6 3.8 2.8 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2108 
MUSD 401 865 502 -21.4 648 1.612 -459.9 
Yield (%) 3.9 6.6 3.3 -0.06 4.1 10.4 -2.6 
Source: data from Source: author calculations from WB (2018), UNCTAD (2020), Ministry 
of Plan and Finance (2006) and Ministry of Finance (2007-2019) 
 
The correlation between the price at the oil international market/instability in 
world economy and the return value of the PF is clear. In 2008, the first oil price shock 
and the financial crisis led to a sharp fall in the gain, from 223.7 MUSD to 31.5 MUSD 
the following year. The same applies in the day after the second oil shock, in 2014: the 
revenue was negative and the same occurred in a more dramatic way in 2018. The same 
observations could be made in relation to the yield. Near zero in 2009, and negative in 
2015 and 2018. 
This put pressure on the national budget and the government was obliged to 
obtain authorization by the national parliament to withdraw more than the 3% of the 
Estimated Sustainable Income (ESI). The consequence is a reduction of the total asset 
value of the PF and potentially less revenue for the coming years. On the other hand, 
and more recently, the government decided to acquire an ownership interest in the 
Greater Sunrise project. The transaction of executed in April 2019, as an investment in 
debt issued by Timor Gap E.P. The PF’ equity allocation was reduced to account for 
the new investment” (MF, 2019, p.3). 
4. Discussing 
 
Financing development is one, if not the main, priority that East Timor 
government faces since independence. As shown above, the domestic financial tool that 
the government can use is the return from the application of the oil wealth under the 
Petroleum Fund, but it is limited to 3% of PF’s total value. How important is it relatively 
to the total amount from external financing sources?  Looking at all the components, 
including exports of goods and services, PT’s return value is not the main source, as 





Table 14: Financing development : sources of External Currency  (M USD) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
ODA  219.05 175.03 161.24 184.62 209.14 279.96 271.37 212.55 290.03 
FDI  4.51  0.91 8.47 8.69 39.69 49.93 28.51 
Remittances     3.64 10.44 17.65 113.34 137.13 
Exp (G+S)     43.34 69.15 58.14 66.14 94.88 
Petro Fund     7.3 48.8 92.4 223.7 31.5 221 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2108  
ODA  275.8 284.28 259.28 251.31 212.52 223.79 232.01 207.34  
FDI 47.07 38.53 49.61 49.34 42.99 5.47 6.71 47.92  
Remittances 136.89 119.85 33.64 43.67 61.58 80.17 87.04 96.32  
Exp (G+S) 101.25 102.69 87.86 89.59 91.00 96.78 109.89 241.30  
Petro Fund 221 401 865 502 -21.4 648 1.612 -459.9  
Source: author calculations from WB (2018), UNCTAD (2020) and Ministry of Finance 
(2005-2019) 
 
In order to better balance the two main sources of catching hard currency 
(externally and domestically), a look at Table 15 launches a first glimpse on this matter 
(in value see Annex 4)3.  
 
Table 15: External financing versus domestic financing (Petroleum Fund, excluding 
Exports) (%) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
External financing 100 100 100 96.2 81.9 76.4 59.5 92.3 67.3 
Return Petro Fund - - - 3.8 18.1 23.6 40.5 7.7 32.7 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2108  
External financing 67.5 52.5 28.4 40.7 107.2 32.3 99.5 524.2  
Return Petro Fund 32.5 47.5 71.6 59.3 -7.2 67.7 0.5 -424.2  
Source: author calculations from WB (2018), UNCTAD (2020) and Ministry of Finance 
(2005-2019) 
 
By comparing the two sources of financing, it becomes clear that only in 2013, 
2014 and 2016 has the share of PF’s return been above 50%, and that in 2015 and 2018 
the gain was negative. The conclusion is clear and highlights the importance of external 
financing. And looking at its components and accordingly to what has been exposed, 
ODA is by far the main source, as Table 16 elucidates ((in value see Annex 5): 
 
 
3 Exports are usually not considered, and here we follow the trend. Loans are also not included because of their 





Table 16: Sources of external financing (share, %) 
 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total ODA 100 97.5 100.0 99.5 94.5 93.6 82.6 56.6 63.6 
FDI - 2.5 - 0.5 3.8 2.9 12.1 13.3 6.3 
Remittances - - - - 1.6 3.5 5.4 30.2 30.1 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2108  
Total ODA 60.0 64.2 75.7 73.0 67.0 72.3 71.2 59.0  
FDI 10.2 8.7 14.5 14.3 13.6 1.8 2.1 13.6  
Remittances 29.8 27.1 9.8 12.7 19.4 25.9 26.7 27.4  
Source: author calculations from WB (2018), UNCTAD (2020)  
 
In every single year ODA contributes to more than 50% of external financing. 
In 11 out of 17 years, ODA achieved more than 70%. FDI is the third source, although 
attracting it should be a priority due to its economic and social impacts. Opposite to 
this, a remarkable remittances inflow since 2009 must be stressed. In the last there years, 
and consistently, remittances are equivalent to one quarter of external financing value 
(Curtain, 2018). And as Rose (2019) points out, “last year remittances became Timor-
Leste’s largest non-oil source of income, before coffee but after aid” (Rose, 2019). 
In relation to what has been written above, one cannot conclude that the 
Petroleum Fund is not such an important source of financing. Therefore, it is necessary 
to separate the value of the PF and the annual return obtained from the application of 
its assets. The value of the PT is annually cumulative and pretends to assure national 
wealth for the future generations. It should not be spent without rules, and that explains 
the existence of the 3% rule of the ESI. Another issue is the annually return obtained. 
This is the domestic source of hard currency to be compared to external sources (ODA, 
FDI and remittances loans). The PT can be used breaking the 3% rule in exceptional 
situations. At the same time, it is a very meaningful indicator of East Timor’s financial 
risk default. And this accounts in favor of the country: “the Petroleum Fund (PF)—
estimated at 506 percent of GDP in 2018— is large relative to projected debt levels and 
debt service requirements (IMF, 2019b, p.1).   
The central issue is, therefore, how long will it take for the oil fields to be 
depleted, since oil and gas are non-renewable commodities. The IMF calls the attention 
to this huge challenge: “with oil revenue from active fields expected to end in 2022, 
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continued drawdowns of the Petroleum Fund could pose risks to long-run fiscal 
sustainability. Beyond the medium-term, the development of the Greater Sunrise fields 
represents an upside risk” (IMF, 2019a). 
 In short, the core question about sources of East Timor’s development financing 
is the amount, but also the stability, of the value coming from each one of the different 
sources of financing. Having looked at the return of the PF, we must now turn the 
analysis to external financing and ODA in particular.  
If the value of the PF depends on the international market oil price and on its 
yield on the behavior of the world economy, ODA, FDI or remittances depend on 
donors, investors and emigrants’ decisions and on the influence of domestic 
environment. Motivations and interests are always present in each case. If East Timor 
poses a high economic or political risk, investors stay away from the internal market, 
and the same might occur with emigrant’s decisions. In these circumstances capital and 
cash inflows can be unstable in value. The same applies to the allocation of ODA, but 
there are some differences. For multilateral ODA there are programs and projects less 
dependent of the domestic situation. But for bilateral ODA, it is just not like that.  
Bilateral ODA is, of course, an instrument of donor’s foreign policy. The 
literature review in point 1 of this dissertation summarized the main findings on this 
theme. In bilateral aid, factors such as the economic, the humanitarian, the political, the 
geopolitical, the diplomatic and so on, influence how much and in what way ODA 
should be delivered to recipient countries. It means that annual ODA might not be so 
stable in value. 
As more and more countries are looking to East Timor, be it for its geographical 
position or for its oil and gas fields, the involvement of the main partners - the traditional 
or the new comers (China) -  through ODA, FDI, loans or remittances, relies on several 








Table 17: Partner’s motivations and interests in the relationship with East Timor 
 






Australia X   X X  
Japan    x X x 
Portugal x X X X   
USA x    X X X 
China X   X X X 
Indonesia X x x X X  
Note: X -strong factor; x – less strong factor 
 
 There is not a clear pattern linking the main ODA’s donors to the economic 
factor. The presence of Australia’s oil companies explains why this country is the first 
ODA donor. But that factor does not explain at all the top ranking of Japan and Portugal 
as ODA donors. And for a newcomer like China4, news about interests in exploring oil 
as “the consideration of a US$16 billion loan to develop an offshore oil and gas field”5 
, or the implementation of Digital Terrestrial Television (DTT)6 among other examples, 
explain the importance of the economic factor in China’s aid, investment or loans. The 
historical and cultural motivation is almost unique for Portugal, even if the Portuguese 
oil company Galp has a 10% stake in Block E operated by the Italian ENI7 or Grupo 
Nabeiro’s investment in the coffee production. The historical and cultural motivation 
also applies to Indonesia, but in a smaller degree. The diplomatic and geopolitical 
factors are common to the main East Timor’s partners, with some differences as we 
consider the regional or the world dispute. For geographical reasons, Asian countries 
are very keen on being there. As a world power, the USA share this regional influence. 
 Having said that, we can return to the fence, i.e., look at the more or less stability 
of the different influx in value, by comparing the two main components, ODA and the 
PF return.  
 
4  See David Hutt, “Is China's Influence in Timor-Leste Rising?”, The Diplomat, November 19, 2016 
5 See Meaghan Tobin, East Timor wants to tap oil and gas near Australia, so why is it courting China?, 3 Aug, 
2019, retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/3021223/east-timor-wants-tap-oil-
and-gas-near-australia-so-why-it  
6 Timor-Leste to Relaunch Chinese-Led Digital Terrestrial Television (DTT) Project, retrieved from 
https://www.clbrief.com/timor-leste-to-relaunch-chinese-led-digital-terrestrial-television-dtt-project/ 




  In order to compare the volatile degree of the different sources of financing, we 
calculated a dispersion measure using the coefficient of variation (CV) or the relative 
standard deviation (RSD) (Table 18): 
Table 18: coefficient of variation (CV) of sources of financing 
 Petro Fund return ODA FDI Remittances 
2005-07 0.859683 0.220455 0.735774 0.682911 
2008-13 0.880899 0.105674 0.196849 0.572665 
2014-18 3.323356 0.077154 0.734541 0.285964 
2005-18 1.651295 0.143187 0.648521 0.65662 
Source: author’s calculation from UNCTAD data (2020) 
 
The period 2005-2018 has been split in three other sub-periods, the first 
beginning soon after independence and during the oil boom, the second coinciding with 
the first negative oil shock and the last sub-period corresponding to the second negative 
oil shock.  
The results are clear: ODA is by far the less volatile, on the period 2005-18, 
achieving 0.143 followed by FDI and remittances, 0.648 and 0.656, respectively. The 
CV of Petro Fund return was 1.65, i.e., eleven times higher than that of ODA. The same 
conclusion might be observed in each sub-period. It is worth noting that the huge PF 
return’s coefficient of variation during the most volatile period of oil prices (2014-
2018), with a value of 3.323, while ODA’s CV was just 0.07, or forty-three times less!  
 The importance of the Petroleum Fund and the income generated from it is 
unavoidable. It is almost the only, and very significant, hard currency national source. 
But it heavily depends on the international oil price and on the scale of oil and gas 
production. Like a resource curse, oil might paradoxically be an obstacle, and as 
Nygaard-Christensen (2016) points out “Timor-Leste and its new government faces the 
challenge of how to diversify its economy away from its current heavy dependence on 
the Petroleum Fund to finance its national development”. On the opposite side, ODA is 
based on multiannual agreements, usually a three years schedule. This allows East 
Timor government to have a more reliable and expectable amount of external support, 
and helps East Timor government to assure not only public goods such as education and 
health but also technical cooperation in all sectors, support to infrastructures (sanitation, 
water and energy supply, roads, etc. ) and the state budget. And yet, some authors are 
very critical about the aid: “international assistance to Timor-Leste is not about 
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cooperation, and not about cooptation only, but also about business… it’s a dilemma to 
understand international assistance in Timor-Leste… the donors use their money not to 
strengthen our independence, but to force us to be dependent again” (Neves, 2006, 
p.18). 
Anyway, as the oil sector in the country faces challenges for the future, ODA 
will continue to play a prominent role in financing and supporting the country’s 
development, even if East Timor is considered an oil producing country and does not 
belong to OPEC. 
Conclusion 
 
East Timor’s economy is too dependent on a ‘domestic’ income source such as oil 
and natural gas, which will eventually come to an end, and on an external source, ODA. 
Other external financing sources such as FDI, remittances or loans seem to be hardly 
mobilized in absolute terms to become an alternative, or at least a significantly 
complementary source, despite the fact that remittances are on the rise. Timorese 
government has an urgent need to make East Timor attractive to FDI, but this will take 
time. Until then, ODA inflows will remain unavoidable. 
 
Australia is by far the biggest ODA (in gross disbursements) donor to East Timor, 
and at the same time the country most involved in oil and gas fields production. Japan, 
the United States of America and Portugal are other important donors, and for Portugal, 
East Timor is a more relevant priority than for the other countries (Portugal gives almost 
5% of its total net ODA, more than the double of the proportion given by Australia). 
The reasons for this are diverse and Table 17 elucidates it. While Australian, Japanese 
and American assistance to East Timor may vary in the future, due to political or 
economic interests, Portugal will always make East Timor one of its development 
assistance priorities as a result of the strong historic and cultural ties that connect both 
countries and also for diplomatic reasons. 
In a different perspective, the fact that East Timor has a sovereign wealth fund – 
the Petroleum Fund – helps the government to address the country’s needs through a 
national financial tool. However, due to the instability of the international oil price and 
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the fall in production, the direct receipts which feed the PF may diminish and the annual 
return obtained in the international financial market might fall as well.  
 Comparing the two main financing sources, Table 18 shows the greater 
instability linked to the oil income compared to ODA. Due to the latter importance in 
absolute value, and despite the fact that East Timor may be considered an oil and gas 
producing country, ODA cannot be discarded, and if East Timor is an oil dependent 
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Annex 1: Allocation of ODA by bilateral donors (M USD) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Portugal 75.85 42.69 25.55 34.69 38.5 46.64 38.99 34.64 33.66 
Australia 37.52 28.87 35.25 38.02 46.08 83.35 74.48 60.71 124.01 
Japan 5.74 8.93 9.88 33.41 21.83 13.07 26.45 11.88 27.67 
USA 27.45 22.72 27.19 19.9 20.64 25.06 32.74 29.07 27.15 
Korea 1.31 0.27 0.1 0.3 0.57 1.36 2.18 1.77 1.82 
UK 10.58 7.38 8.45 1.09 4.21 4 0.23 0.11 .. 
Sweden 3.88 5.44 5.71 2.62 1.61 6.43 6.03 4.59 4.84 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2108  
Portugal 27.65 19.72 17.33 17.68 12.97 14.58 15.44 15.95  
Australia 103.87 107.48 108.57 89.64 62.98 56.78 69.06 59.2  
Japan 26.86 18.83 22.17 19.17 19.27 36.71 24.13 31.56  
USA 36.15 21.59 20.27 28.24 17.8 19.99 22.86 22.65  
Korea 7.02 7.55 3.6 4.02 9.01 12.06 11.77 7.02  
UK 0.07 0.21 0.11 0.07 0.1 0.02 0.3 0.42  



















2005 63,93% 2,35% 6,69% 18,43% 
2006 77,03% 7,21% 2,54% 2,72% 
2007 79,77% 5,62% 5,48% 3,63% 
2008 65,80% 8,35% 10,72% 5,70% 
2009 62,63% 10,85% 7,38% 11,13% 
2010 74,85% 10,69% 5,67% 5,40% 
2011 73,00% 4,59% 8,68% 5,93% 
2012 50,91% 33,65% 6,64% 8,24% 
2013 50,41% 19,79% 14,37% 9,31% 
2014 56,81% 7,95% 13,05% 13,55% 
2015 45,48% 22,25% 13,35% 16,60% 
2016 64,89% 16,29% 4,15% 11,65% 
2017 54,71% 10,22% 8,71% 19,65% 




Annex 3: Financing development: sources of External Currency (%) 
 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
ODA  100.0 97.5 100.0 95.7 66.7 60.8 44.4 44.9 37.6 
FDI  2.5  0.5 2.7 1.9 6.5 10.5 3.7 
Remittances 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 2.3 2.9 23.9 17.8 
Exp (G+S) 0.0 0.0 0.0  13.8 15.0 9.5 14.0 12.3 
Petro Fund  0.0 0.0 0.0 3.8 15.6 20.1 36.6 6.7 28.6 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2108  
ODA  35.3 30.0 20.0 26.9 55.0 21.2 53.1 155.9  
FDI 6.0 4.1 3.8 5.3 11.1 0.5 1.5 36.0  
Remittances 17.5 12.7 2.6 4.7 15.9 7.6 19.9 72.4  
Exp (G+S) 12.9 10.9 6.8 9.6 23.5 9.2 25.1 181.4  
Petro Fund 28.3 42.4 66.8 53.6 -5.5 61.5 0.4 -345.8  
Source: author calculations from WB (2018), UNCTAD (2020) and Ministry of Finance 
(2005-2019) 
 
Annex 4: Table: Sources of external financing (M USD) 
 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total ODA  219.05 175.03 161.24 184.62 209.14 279.96 271.37 212.55 290.03 
FDI - 4.519 - 0.908 8.478 8.695 39.698 49.931 28.516 
Remittances - - - - 3.642 10.444 17.655 113.34 137.13 
TOTAL 219.05 179.54 161.24 185.52 221.26 299.09 328.72 375.82 455.68 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2108  
Total ODA  275.8 284.28 259.28 251.31 212.52 223.79 232.01 207.34  
FDI 47.075 38.531 49.615 49.344 42.995 5.479 6.716 47.926  
Remittances 136.89 119.85 33.649 43.679 61.586 80.174 87.044 96.32  
TOTAL 459.77 442.67 342.54 344.33 317.10 309.44 325.77 351.58  
Source: author calculations from WB (2018), UNCTAD (2020)  
 
 
Annex 5: External financing versus domestic financing (Petroleum Fund, excluding 
Exports) (M USD) 
 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
External financing 219 179.5 161.2 185.5 221.2 299 328.7 375.8 455.6 
Return Petro Fund - - - 7.3 48.8 92.4 223.7 31.5 221 
TOTAL 219 179.5 161.2 192.8 270 391.4 552.4 407.3 676.6 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2108  
External financing 459.7 442.6 342.5 344.3 317.1 309.4 325.7 351.5  
Return Petro Fund 221 401 865 502 -21.4 648 1.612 -459.9  
TOTAL 680.7 843.6 1207.5 846.3 295.7 957.4 327.31 -108.4  
Source: author calculations from WB (2018), UNCTAD (2020) and Ministry of Finance 
(2005-2019) 
 
